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he literature on political cycles argues that the proximity of the next
election date affects policy choices (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen
[1997]; Drazen [2000]; and Shi and Svensson [2003] present reviews
of this literature).1 Evidence of such cycles is stronger for economies that
are less developed, have younger democracies, have less government trans-
parency, have less media freedom, have a larger share of uninformed voters in
theelectorate,andhaveahigherre-electionvalue. BrenderandDrazen(2005)
ﬁnd evidence of a political deﬁcit cycle in a large cross-section of countries
but show that this ﬁnding is driven by the experience of “new democracies.”
The budget cycle disappears when the new democracies are removed from
their sample. Similarly, using a large panel data set, Shi and Svensson (2006)
ﬁnd that, on average, governments’ﬁscal deﬁcits increase by almost 1 percent
of gross domestic product in election years, and that these political budget
cycles are signiﬁcantly larger and statistically more robust in developing than
in developed countries. Using suitable proxies, they also ﬁnd that the size of
the electoral budget cycles increases with the size of politicians’ rents from
remaining in power, and with the share of informed voters in the electorate.
AkhmedovandZhuravskaya(2004)usearegionalmonthlypanelfromRussia
and ﬁnd a sizable and short-lived political budget cycle (public spending is
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shifted toward direct monetary transfers to voters). They also ﬁnd that the
magnitude of the cycle decreases over time and with democracy, government
transparency, media freedom, and voter awareness. They argue that the short
length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by studies that use
lower frequency data.
Why would policymakers prefer to inﬂuence economic conditions at the
end of their term rather than at the beginning of their term? This article
discusses some answers to this question provided by the theoretical literature
on political cycles.
Moregenerally,thisarticlediscussesagencyrelationshipsinwhichanim-
portant part of the compensation is decided upon infrequently. For instance,
my framework could be used to discuss incentives when a contract commits
the employer to working with a certain employee for a number of periods, but
allows the employer to replace this employee after the contract ends. Con-
sider, for example, a professional athlete who signs a multi-year contract with
a team, which is free to terminate its relationship with this athlete (or not)
after the contract ends. Do athletes have stronger incentives to improve their
performance just before their contract expires? Wilczynski (2004) and Stiroh
(2007) present empirical evidence of a renegotiation cycle: performance im-
provesintheyearbeforethesigningofamulti-yearcontract,butdeclinesafter
the contract is signed. Renegotiation cycles resemble the cycles discussed in
the political-economy literature. Even though my analysis applies to other
employment relationships, for concreteness, this article refers to voters and
policymakers.
Istudypoliticalcyclesinastandardthree-periodpolitical-agencymodelof
career concerns. An incumbent policymaker who starts his political career in
periodonewithanaveragereputationcanexerteffortinperiodsoneandtwoto
increasehisre-electionprobability. Eachperiod,theincumbent’sperformance
depends on his ability, his effort level, and luck. Voters do not observe the
incumbent’s ability, effort, and luck; instead, they observe his performance.
Good current performance by the incumbent may signal that he is capable of
good performance in the future. Voters re-elect the incumbent only if they
expect that his performance will be good in the future. Since the incumbent
wantstobere-elected,hemayexertefforttoimprovehiscurrentperformance.2
2 By assuming that the policymaker can inﬂuence the beliefs about his future performance,
the literature on political cycles does not imply that he can ﬁne-tune the aggregate economic effects
of economic policy. One may think that the policymaker is evaluated on the quality of services he
provides. For instance, Brender (2003) ﬁnds that “the incremental student success rate during the
mayor’s term had a signiﬁcant positive effect on his reelection chances.” The quality of education
depends on economic policy (for example, it depends on the resources the policymaker makes
available for education). Thus, the policymaker may decide to make more resources available
for education (instead of keeping resources for his favorite interest group or himself) in order to
increase his re-election probability.L. Martinez: Political Incentives and Elections 317
Earlier theoretical studies of political cycles succeeded in showing that
in environments with asymmetric information about the incumbent’s unob-
servable and stochastically evolving ability (as the one studied in this article),
cycles can arise with forward-looking and rational voters. These studies show
that political cycles may arise because the incumbent’s end-of-term perfor-
mance may be more informative about the quality of his future (post-election)
performance than his beginning-of-term performance. Therefore, the incum-
bent’s end-of-term actions (that inﬂuence his end-of-term performance) may
be more effective in inﬂuencing the election result than his beginning-of-term
actions (that inﬂuence his beginning-of-term performance). Consequently,
the incumbent may have stronger incentives to improve his performance at
the end of his term. For expositional simplicity, these studies model this intu-
ition in its most extreme form. That is, they assume that only the end-of-term
incumbent’s action is effective in changing the election result (see, for ex-
ample, Rogoff [1990], Shi and Svensson [2006], and the references therein).
Thus, re-electionconcernsplayaroleonlyattheendofaterm, and, therefore,
political cycles arise.
These earlier studies make three assumptions that imply that the incum-
bent only affects his re-election probability by inﬂuencing his end-of-term
performance. The ﬁrst assumption is that at the time of the election, only the
end-of-term ability is not observable. If beginning-of-term ability is observ-
able,theincumbentcannotinﬂuencevoters’beliefswithhisbeginning-of-term
actions and, therefore, cycles arise.
The second assumption is that only end-of-term ability is correlated with
post-election ability. Consequently, only voters’inference about end-of-term
ability directly inﬂuences their re-election decision.
The third assumption is that output is a perfect signal of ability. This
implies that voters can learn the incumbent’s end-of-term ability (which is
correlated with his post-election ability) perfectly from his end-of-term per-
formance, without considering his beginning-of-term performance. There-
fore, beginning-of-term actions are not effective in changing the re-election
probability.
The three assumptions described above imply strong asymmetries across
periods. Political cycles in these earlier studies are a direct result of these
asymmetries.
In Martinez (2009b), I explain why political cycles may arise even if
the incumbent’s end-of-term performance is not more informative about the
quality of his future performance, and, consequently, the incumbent’s end-
of-term actions are not more effective in inﬂuencing the election result. In
the model, the incumbent’s equilibrium effort choice depends on both the
proximity of the next election and his reputation (which I refer to as the
beliefs about his ability). Recall that we want to study how the proximity of
elections affects policy choices. Consequently, with political cycles I refer318 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
to differences in the incumbent’s choices within a term in ofﬁce for a given
reputation level. For a given reputation level, why would the incumbent exert
more effort closer to the election? If the incumbent’s reputation does not
change between periods one and two, why would the incumbent exert more
effort in period two than in period one?
The key insight to the answer to these questions comes from the char-
acterization of the incumbent’s effort-smoothing decision, which is such that
he makes the marginal cost of exerting effort in period one (roughly) equal
to the expected marginal cost of exerting effort in period two. This decision
presents the typical intertemporal tradeoff in dynamic models: Having less
utility in period one allows the incumbent to have more utility in period two.
In this case, a lower expected effort level in period two compensates for a
higher effort level in period one. In period one, the incumbent (whose repu-
tation is average) knows that his reputation is likely to change and anticipates
that this change will lead him to choose an effort level lower than the one
he would choose in period two if his reputation remains average—extreme
reputations imply low efforts. Consequently, the expected marginal cost of
exerting effort in period two is lower than the marginal cost of the equilibrium
period-two effort level for an average reputation (the marginal cost is an in-
creasing function). Thus, the incumbent’s effort-smoothing decision implies
that the marginal cost of the equilibrium period-one effort level—which is
equal to the expected marginal cost of exerting effort in period two—is lower
than the marginal cost of the equilibrium period-two effort level for the same
(average) reputation. Therefore, for the same reputation, the period-one equi-
librium effort level is lower than that of period two. That is, incentives to
inﬂuence the re-election probability are stronger closer to the election.
In another context, consider a professional athlete who has an average
reputation at the beginning of a multi-year contract with a team and may want
to exert effort in order to improve his reputation and obtain a good contract
afterhiscurrentcontractends. Thediscussionaboveindicatesthattheoptimal
strategy for the athlete is to wait until the end of his current contract to see
whether it is worth exerting a high effort level. At the beginning of his current
contract, he should choose an intermediate effort level. At the end of his
contract, if his reputation remains average, he should choose a higher effort
level. If his reputation became either very good or very bad (because his
performance was very good or very bad), he should choose a lower effort
level. Thus, for the same reputation level, the athlete exerts more effort at the
end of his contract and there is a “renegotiation cycle.”
This article ﬁrst characterizes a model with the three simplifying assump-
tionsadoptedinearlierstudies. Then, eachofthethreeassumptionsdescribed
above is relaxed, and yet the model still generates cycles without assuming
strong asymmetries across periods because of the effort-smoothing consider-
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The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the
main elements of a standard model of political cycles. Section 2 character-
izes a benchmark with the three simplifying assumptions adopted in earlier
studies. These assumptions are relaxed in Sections 3, 4, and 5. Section 3
assumes that beginning-of-term ability is not observable. It is shown that
this does not change the incumbent’s equilibrium decisions but it makes the
optimal period-two effort level a function of the period-one effort level. In
Section 4, I assume positive correlation between beginning-of-term ability
and post-election ability. I show that the incumbent still chooses to exert zero
effort at the beginning of the term, but his end-of-term equilibrium effort level
depends on his period-one ability. In Section 5, it is assumed that observ-
ing performance in one period is not sufﬁcient to fully learn ability, and it is
explained how the incumbent’s optimal effort-smoothing decision generates
cycles. Section 6 concludes.
1. THE MODEL
This article presents a three-period political-agency model of career concerns.
In period one, there is a new policymaker in ofﬁce. At the beginning of period
three, elections are held: Voters decide whether to re-elect the incumbent
policymaker or replace him with a policymaker who was not previously in
ofﬁce.
The amount of public good produced by the incumbent policymaker in
period t, yt, is a stochastic function of his ability, ηt, and his effort level, at.
In particular,
yt = at + ηt + εt, (1)
where εt is a random variable.
Each period, the policymaker in ofﬁce can exert effort to increase the
amount of public good he produces. Voters do not observe the effort level
(which is, of course, known by the incumbent policymaker).
The incumbent and voters do not know the incumbent’s ability. The com-
mon belief about the ability of a new incumbent is given by the distribution
of abilities in the economy.
Thetimingofeventswithineachperiodisasfollows. First,theincumbent
decidesonhiseffortlevel,afterwhichηt andεt arerealized,andyt isobserved.
Voters’ per-period utility is given by yt. In period three, they decide on
re-election in order to maximize the expected value of y3.
A policymaker’s per-period utility is normalized to zero if he is not in
ofﬁce. He receives R>0 in each period during which he is in charge of the
production of the public good. The cost of exerting effort is given by c(a),
with c  (a) ≥ 0, c   (a) > 0, and c  (0) = 0. Let δ ∈ (0,1) denote the voters’320 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
and the incumbent’s discount factor. I use backward induction to solve for the
subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
2. A BENCHMARK
Thissectionprovidesabenchmarkfollowingearlierstudiesofpoliticalcycles
by assuming that only the ability in the last period before the election is not
observable at the time of the election, that ability follows a ﬁrst-order moving
averageprocess, andthatoutputisaperfectsignalofability(see, forexample,
Rogoff [1990], Shi and Svensson [2006], and the references therein).
The ﬁrst period a policymaker is in ofﬁce, his ability is given by ηt = γ t,
andineveryotherperiod,ηt = γ t+γ t−1,whereγ t isani.i.d. randomvariable
with mean m1, differentiable distribution function  , and density function φ.
When voters decide on re-election, γ 1 is known and γ 2 is not known. The
production function is deterministic: εt = 0 for all t.
Observingoutputyt allowsvotersandtheincumbenttocomputethevalues
of ηt and γ t using their knowledge of the effort exerted by the incumbent and
the production function. Let ηvt and ηit denote the ability computed by voters
and by the incumbent, respectively. Let γ vt and γ it denote the value of γ t
computed by voters and the incumbent, respectively. The incumbent knows
the effort level he chooses and, therefore, he always can compute ηt = yt −at
correctly (i.e., ηit = ηt). Using η1, he can compute the value of γ 2:
γ i2 = y2 − η1 − a2 = γ 2.
Voterscomputeη2andγ 2usingequilibriumeffortlevels. Theyarerational
andunderstandthegame. Inparticular,theyknowtheincumbent’sequilibrium
strategy. At the time the incumbent decides his period-two effort level, he
knows a1 and y1. Recall that the latter is a function of a1 and, therefore,
we can summarize the information available to the incumbent by the effort
component, a1, and the stochastic component, η1 = y1 − a1,o fy1. For any




denote the incumbent’s equilibrium period-
two effort level. Let a∗
1 denote the incumbent’s equilibrium period-one effort
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In period three, there is no future re-election probability that could be
inﬂuenced by the incumbent. Therefore, any policymaker would exert zero
effort. Consequently,whenforward-lookingvotersdecideonre-election,they
compare the incumbent’s period-three expected ability with the period-three
expected ability of a policymaker who was not previously in ofﬁce. The
incumbent’s period-three expected ability computed by voters is equal to γ v2.
Theexpectedperiod-threeabilityofapolicymakerwhowasnotinofﬁcebefore
is m1. Consequently, voters re-elect the incumbent if and only if γ v2 >m 1.L. Martinez: Political Incentives and Elections 321











− a2. Thus, exerting effort in period
two decreases the minimum realization of γ 2 that would allow the incumbent
to be re-elected and, therefore, it increases the re-election probability.



























is the probability of re-election. Note
that the incumbent can compute equilibrium effort levels as voters do (all in-
formationavailabletovotersisalsoavailabletotheincumbent)and,therefore,






In this article, I characterize the incumbent’s equilibrium effort levels
throughtheﬁrst-orderconditionofhismaximizationproblems.3 Notethatfor
ﬁndingtheequilibriumeffortlevel,wesolveaﬁxed-pointproblem. Theeffort
level that maximizes the incumbent’s expected utility in (3) depends on the





. In equilibrium, the
incumbent’seffortlevelmustbeequaltotheeffortlevelvotersusetocompute
the signal.
The optimal period-two effort level satisﬁes


























= δRφ(m1) > 0. (5)
Equation(5)showsthattheequilibriumeffortlevelissuchthatthemarginal
cost of exerting effort is equal to the marginal beneﬁt of exerting effort. The
incumbent beneﬁts from exerting effort because this increases the re-election
probability. The marginal beneﬁt of exerting effort is given by the change
in the probability of re-election multiplied by R (the value of winning the
election) and the discount factor, δ.
It should be mentioned that, in models of career concerns, equilibrium
effort levels are typically inefﬁcient (for a more thorough discussion of this
issue, see Foerster and Martinez [2006]). The efﬁcient effort level is the one
a benevolent social planner would force the incumbent to exert (if he could
observe the effort exerted by the incumbent). This effort level can be deﬁned
astheoneatwhichthesocialmarginalcostofexertingeffort(theincumbent’s
marginalcost)equalsthesocialmarginalbeneﬁtofexertingeffort(theincrease
3As in previous models of political agency, assumptions are necessary to guarantee the con-
cavity of these problems in which the re-election probability may not be a concave function of
the incumbent’s decision. For example, the ﬁrst term in the objective function in (3) may not be
globally concave. In order to assure global concavity of the incumbent’s problems, it is sufﬁcient
to assume enough convexity in the cost of the effort function.322 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
in output implied by an extra unit of effort, which according to the production
functioninequation1isequaltoone). Sincetheincumbent’smarginalbeneﬁt
of exerting effort represented in the right-hand side of equation (5) is typically
different from the marginal productivity of effort, the equilibrium effort level
is typically inefﬁcient. Furthermore, since the social marginal beneﬁt and
marginal cost of exerting effort are the same every period, political cycles
(differences in effort levels within a term) imply inefﬁciencies.
Note that a∗
2 does not depend on η1 or a1. Equation (4) shows that, since
the period-two equilibrium effort level does not depend on η1 or a1, off the
equilibrium path (i.e., when a1  = a∗
1) the optimal period-two effort level does
not depend on η1 or a1 (for a more thorough discussion of how the history
of the game affects the agent’s strategy in models of career concerns, see






In period one, the incumbent anticipates equilibrium play in the subse-
quent periods. In particular, the incumbent anticipates that the probability of
re-election is given by 1 −  (m1) and does not depend on his period-one
effort level. Consequently, the period-one equilibrium effort level is given by
a∗
1 = 0 <a ∗
2.
Thus, I have shown that, under the standard assumptions in earlier studies
of political cycles, the incumbent can affect his re-election probability only
with the last effort level prior to the election and, therefore, cycles appear
(the incumbent only chooses a positive effort level in period two). In the next
sections, I shall discuss the consequences of relaxing these assumptions.
3. SYMMETRIC OBSERVABILITY




the analysis, but that not exerting effort in period one is still optimal for the
incumbent. The period-two equilibrium effort level is also identical to the one
found in Section 2. The assumption on the observability of η1 only affects the
incumbent’s off-equilibrium period-two optimal effort choices.
Let
ηv1 = y1 − a∗
1 = η1 + a1 − a∗
1 (6)
denote the period-one ability computed by voters using the equilibrium effort
level. Using ηv1 and the equilibrium effort strategies, voters compute












AsinSection2,theincumbentisre-electedifandonlyifγ v2 >m 1. Hecan
compute a∗
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In equilibrium, a1 = a∗










equation 6). Consequently, the period-two equilibrium effort level is the same




= δRφ(m1) > 0).
Note that, as in Section 2, the equilibrium period-two effort level does not
depend on η1 and a1. However, if η1 is not observable, off equilibrium the
optimal period-two effort level depends on a1. Let ˆ α2 (a1) denote this optimal
effort level, which satisﬁes





m1 + a1 − a∗
1 + a∗
2 −ˆ α2 (a1)
 
.
At the beginning of period two, the incumbent’s expected utility is given
by
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m1 + a1 − a∗
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The period-one incumbent’s maximization problem is given by
max
a1≥0
{δW2 (a1) − c(a1)}.
Recallthat,sincetheincumbent’speriod-oneability,η1,isnotobservable,
theperiod-oneabilitycomputedbyvoters,ηv1,isincreasingwithrespecttoa1.
Thus, in period one, the incumbent could choose a higher effort level in order
to make voters believe that he has more ability. However, the incumbent’s
continuation utility is lower when voters believe that his period-one ability is
higher. There are two reasons for this.
First, undertheassumptionsinthissection(andinearlierstudiesofpoliti-
cal cycles), only period-two ability is correlated with period-three ability and,
therefore, only period-two ability directly inﬂuences the re-election decision.
Consequently, the incumbent would only want to inﬂuence voters’period-one
inference in order to inﬂuence their period-two inference.
Second,foranyperiod-twooutputobservation,y2,voters’inferenceabout
the period-two ability, γ v2, is decreasing with respect to ηv1 (see equation 7).
Ifηv1 ishigher,votersbelievethaty2 istheresultofahigherperiod-oneability
and a lower period-two ability.
Since the incumbent’s continuation utility is lower when voters believe
that his period-one ability is higher, W2 (a1) is decreasing with respect to a1
(recall that equation 6 shows that ηv1 is increasing with respect to a1). That
is, the incumbent does not have incentives to exert effort in period one. If he
exerted effort, he would both suffer the cost of exerting effort and decrease324 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
his continuation utility. Therefore, the period-one equilibrium effort level is
given by a∗
1 = 0 <a ∗
2. Thus, equilibrium effort levels are identical to those
found in Section 2, and the assumption on the observability of η1 only affects
the incumbent’s off-equilibrium period-two optimal effort choices.
4. A RANDOM WALK PROCESS FORABILITY
Intheprevioussection, Ishowedthatwhentheincumbent’speriod-oneability
is not correlated with his post-election ability (and, therefore, his period-one
effort cannot directly inﬂuence the re-election probability), the incumbent
does not want to exert effort in period one. This section studies the effects of
allowing for correlation between the period-one ability and the post-election
ability.
Following Holmstr¨ om’s (1999) seminal paper on career concerns, I as-
sume that ηt+1 = ηt + ξt, where ξt is normally distributed with mean 0 and
precision hξ (the variance is 1
hξ ), and it is unobservable. The common belief
about the ability of a new incumbent is given by the distribution of abilities
in the economy, which is normally distributed with mean m1 and precision hη
(these are the beliefs about the period-one incumbent’s ability). Thus, results
presented in this section are a special case of the results presented in Martinez
(2009b). Let φ(v;x,z)denote the density function for a normally distributed
random variable V with mean x and precision z, and let  (v;x,z)denote the
corresponding cumulative distribution function.
As in previous sections, the incumbent is re-elected if and only if his
expected period-three ability is higher than the expected period-three ability























































In equilibrium, a1 = a∗





















level, which is given by











Note that, in this section, the period-two equilibrium effort level depends
on the period-one ability η1 (recall this was not the case in previous sec-
tions). The realization of period-one ability shock affects the distribution of
the period-two ability shock.L. Martinez: Political Incentives and Elections 325














































denote the derivative of the period-two equilibrium effort level
with respect to the period-one ability. The following proposition presents the
incumbent’s effort-smoothing decision (seeAppendixA for the proof).
Proposition 1 There exists a unique period-one equilibrium effort level that
satisﬁes






















The Euler equation (13) represents the typical intertemporal tradeoff in
dynamic models: Having less utility in period one allows the incumbent to
have more utility in period two. In this case, a lower expected effort level in
periodtwocompensatesforahighereffortlevelinperiodone. Theincumbent
knows that he could affect the re-election probability by exerting effort in
periods one and two. He could exert more effort in period one and less effort
in period two (or vice versa) and still have the same re-election probability.
Equation (13) shows that the optimal effort-smoothing decision depends
on the cost and the effectiveness of exerting effort in each period. In equa-





represents the relative effectiveness in changing ηv2 (and,
therefore, the re-election probability) of a1 (compared with a2). The incum-
bent’s period-one effort level affects ηv1 directly, and it affects ηv2 through
ηv1. His period-two effort level affects ηv2 directly. Thus, the relative effec-





, with respect to ηv1.F o r
example, if voters expect a lower period-two effort level from an incumbent
who is perceived to be better, then, by choosing a higher effort level in period
one, and making ηv1 higher, the incumbent would make voters expect a lower
period-two effort level. Consequently, voters would think that the period-two
outcomeistheresultofalowerperiod-twoeffortlevelandahigherperiod-two
ability. Thus, the incumbent’s period-one effort would have a positive effect
on the voters’period-two learning.
Thissectionintroducesincentivestoexerteffortatthebeginningofaterm.
These incentives were not present in previous sections, where beginning-of-
term ability was not correlated with post-election ability. A positive relative
effectivenessimpliesthatperiod-oneeffortwaseffectiveinchangingηv2 (and,326 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
therefore,there-electionprobability). Thus,inperiodone,theincumbentmay
want to exert effort. Recall that, in Section 2, the relative effectiveness is zero
(period-one effort is not effective), and in Section 3 it is negative (with the
moving-averageassumption, theincumbent’sexpectedpost-electionabilityis
decreasingwithrespecttothebeginning-of-termabilityinferredbyvoters). In
this section, the relative effectiveness of period-one effort could be positive.
It could even be higher than one (implying that beginning-of-term effort is
moreeffectivethanend-of-termeffortinchangingthere-electionprobability).
However, the next proposition shows that, even though the incumbent could
use beginning-of-term effort to increase the re-election probability, under the
assumptions in this section, the incumbent chooses to exert zero effort at the
beginning of the term because the expected relative effectiveness is equal to
zero (seeAppendix B for the proof).4




this. First, on average, the effect of period-one effort on period-two learning
is zero. Second, period-one learning does not have a direct effect on the
re-election probability (i.e., period-one effort may only affect the re-election
probability through its effect on period-two learning). Since there is no noise
in the production process, learning the incumbent’s period-two performance
is enough to perfectly learn his type. Thus, the policymaker’s behavior is
differentclosertotheelectionbecauseweassumethathisactionscanonlyhave
a direct effect on the re-election probability closer to the election. The next
section explains how the model can generate a cycle without this assumption.
5. A STOCHASTIC PRODUCTION FUNCTION
In previous sections, cycles arise because I assume differences across periods
(besidestheproximityoftheelection). Inparticular,inSection4,Ishowedthat
assumingthatoutputisaperfectsignalofabilitygeneratesastrongasymmetry
across periods. In this section I relax this assumption. In particular, as in
Holmstr¨ om (1999), I assume that εt is a normally distributed random variable
with expected value 0 and precision hε—consequently, I can interpret the
results in Section 4 as the limit of the results presented in this section when
hε goes to inﬁnity. Thus, the model studied in this section is the one-election
version of the model I study in Martinez (2009b).
4As shown in the proof of proposition 2, the symmetry of the equilibrium effort strategy is
necessary to prove this result. In Martinez (2009b), I show that, in a version of the model with
more than three periods in which the incumbent can be re-elected more than once, even if the
ability distribution is symmetric, the equilibrium effort strategy may not be symmetric.L. Martinez: Political Incentives and Elections 327
Since there is noise in production, observing output only allows voters
and the incumbent to compute a “signal” of the incumbent’s ability. This is in
contrast with previous sections, where observing output allows voters and the
incumbenttocomputetheincumbent’sability. Deﬁnest ≡ ηt+εt. Irefertost
astheperiod-t signal oftheincumbent’sability. Votersandtheincumbentuse
the signal they compute to update their beliefs about the incumbent’s ability.
From this point forward, belief refers to belief about the incumbent’s ability
unless stated otherwise.
Beliefs are Gaussian and, therefore, they can be characterized by their
mean and their precision. Depending on the precision of the shock that de-
termines the evolution of the incumbent’s ability, hξ, the precision of beliefs
may be increasing or decreasing with respect to the number of performance
observations (see Holmstr¨ om 1999).5 For simplicity, I assume that hξ is such






By making an assumption that guarantees that the precision of beliefs is con-
stant, I can keep track of their evolution by following the evolution of their
mean. This simpliﬁes the analysis.
Equation (14) implies that for any t, the precision of the period-t + 1
beliefs about the signal st+1 is equal to the precision of the period-t beliefs





Since beliefs about the signal are also Gaussian and have a constant precision,
the evolution of these beliefs can also be summarized by the evolution of their
mean, which is equal to the mean of the beliefs about ability.
As in previous sections, the incumbent is re-elected if and only if his
expected period-three ability is higher than the expected period-three ability
of a policymaker who was not previously in ofﬁce. Let mvt and mit denote
the mean of the voters’and the incumbent’s beliefs at the beginning of period
t (from here on, at period t). I refer to a belief with mean m as belief m. The
incumbent is re-elected if and only if mv3 >m 1.
Bayes’rule implies that the mean of beliefs at t + 1 is a weighted sum of
the mean at t and the period-t signal. Equation (14) implies that the weight
of the period-t mean belief in the period-t + 1 mean belief does not depend
on the number of observations of the incumbent’s performance. This weight
5 In general, the precision of t + 1 believes ht+1 is given by
ht+1 =
(ht + hε)hξ
ht + hε + hξ






Let svt and sit denote the period-t signal computed by voters and by the
incumbent, respectively. Since the incumbent knows the effort he exerted,
he can compute the true signal, i.e., sit = yt − at = st. Thus, mit+1 =
μmit + (1 − μ)sit = μmit + (1 − μ)st.
Voters compute the signal using equilibrium effort strategies. In Section
4, Iwrotetheincumbent’speriod-twoequilibriumstrategyasafunctionofhis
period-one ability and effort level. In this section, at the time of the period-
twoeffortdecision,theincumbentdoesnotknowhisperiod-oneability,buthe
learnedthesignals1. Insteadofwritinghisperiod-twoequilibriumstrategyas
a function of a1 and s1, for expositional simplicity, I will write the equilibrium
strategy as a function of a1 and m2 = μm1 + (1 − μ)s1, α2(m2,a 1). Thus,
the period-two signal computed by voters is given by
sv2 ≡ y2 − α2(mv2,a∗
1) = s2 + a2 − α2(mv2,a∗
1), (17)
where
mv2 = μm1 + (1 − μ)sv1 = μm1 + (1 − μ)
 











mv3 = μmv2 +(1−μ)sv2 = μmv2 +(1−μ)[s2 +a2 −α2(mv2,a∗
1)]. (18)
Equation (18) shows how exerting effort helps the incumbent increase the
re-election probability. The expected ability in the voters’belief is increasing
with respect to effort, and voters re-elect the incumbent if and only if they
expect his ability to be good enough.
Recall that voters and the incumbent have the same period-one belief.
Moreover, in any period in which the incumbent exerts the equilibrium effort
level, voters and the incumbent compute the same signal. Consequently, in










denote the mean of the voters’period-two belief when m2 is the mean of the
incumbent’s period-two belief and a1 is the period-one effort level. Thus, the
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The following proposition shows that a unique ﬁxed point that solves for the
period-two equilibrium effort strategy exists (see Martinez [2009b] for the
proof).6
Proposition 3 (Martinez 2009b): Let m2 denote the voters’and the incum-
bent’s beliefs at the beginning of period two. The unique period-two equilib-
rium effort strategy a∗
2(m2) satisﬁes











Thus, for any reputation m2, the equilibrium period-two effort level a∗
2(m2) is
positive.
Let M2(s1) ≡ μm1 + (1 − μ)s1 denote the mean of the incumbent’s
period-two posterior belief when s1 is the signal he uses to update his prior.










W2 (m2,a 1) = R − c(α2(m2,a 1))
+δR
 
1 −  
 
m1 − μMv2 (m2,a 1)
1 − μ
+ a∗
2(Mv2 (m2,a 1)) − α2(m2,a 1);m2,H
  
denotes the incumbent’s expected utility at the beginning of period two when
his belief is characterized by m2 and he chose a1. The following proposi-
tionpresentstheincumbent’speriod-oneeffort-smoothingdecision(Martinez
[2009b] presents the proof).
Proposition 4 (Martinez 2009b): There exists a unique and positive period-
one equilibrium effort level a∗
1 that satisﬁes







c  (α2(M2(s1)))φ (s1;m1,H)ds1 > 0. (21)
In equation (21), the expected relative effectiveness in changing the re-
election probability of the incumbent’s period-one effort (compared with his
period-twoeffort)isrepresentedbyμ>0,whichindicatestherelativeweight
of sv1 (compared with sv2)i n
mv3 = μ2m1 + (1 − μ)sv2 + μ(1 − μ)sv1.
6 Note that, for μ = 0 (and, therefore, for m2 = η1), the equilibrium effort strategy in
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Thus, the expected relative effectiveness, μ, indicates the relative importance
of the direct effect on the re-election probability of appearing more talented
in period one (recall the incumbent is re-elected if and only if mv3 >m 1).7
Sincetheequilibriumperiod-twoeffortlevelinequation(20)isafunction
of the incumbent’s period-two reputation, m2, differences in the incumbent’s
behavior during his term in ofﬁce could be the result of changes in his repu-
tation and may not imply that he is deciding differently because the election
time is closer. I want to focus on differences in the incumbent’s behavior that
are due to the proximity of the election. Therefore, I refer to differences in
behavior across the incumbent’s term for a given reputation level as political
cycles. The next proposition shows that the model generates such cycles (I
present the proof in Martinez [2009b]).
Proposition 5 (Martinez 2009b): For the same reputation level (m1), the
period-two equilibrium effort level is higher than the period-one equilibrium
effort level.
Recall that the lessened effectiveness of effort further from the election
is the force behind political cycles in previous sections, which present this
mechanism in its most extreme form by making assumptions that imply that
beginning-of-term effort is not expected to be effective in increasing the re-
election probability. In particular, the equilibrium strategy in Section 4 is a
special case of the equilibrium strategy presented in this section for which
period-one effort is not expected to be effective (μ = 0). In contrast, proposi-
tion 5 shows that a standard model can generate cycles for all possible values
of μ. In particular, the model can generate cycles if the effectiveness of
beginning-of-term actions is arbitrarily close to the effectiveness of end-of-
term actions (μ is arbitrarily close to 1). The proposition also shows that
discounting is not necessary for generating cycles in the model: Cycles arise
for all values of δ, including δ = 1.
How could political cycles arise in an economy without no discounting
where manipulating policy is equally effective in every period? As I explain
in Martinez (2009b), cycles could still arise in such an economy because at
the beginning of his term, the incumbent knows that his reputation is likely
to change, and he anticipates that this change will lead him to choose an ef-
fort level lower than the one he would choose at the end of his term for his
beginning-of-term reputation level. Note ﬁrst that the period-two equilib-
rium effort strategy deﬁned in equation (20) is a hump-shaped function of the
7As in Section 4, because of the symmetry of the equilibrium period-two effort strategy, the
incumbent does not expect that his period-one effort will affect the re-election probability through
the period-two effort level used by voters for their period-two learning. In Martinez (2009a), I
present a more thorough discussion of the relative effectiveness and this indirect effect of current-
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incumbent’speriod-tworeputation,m2,asisthesignaldensityfunction.8 That
is,inperiodtwo,theincumbentexertslesseffortwhenhisreputationhasmore
extreme values. Thus, in period one, he anticipates that if his reputation does
not change, he will choose α2 (m1) in period two. He also anticipates that,
for example, if his period-one performance turns out to be either very good or
very bad (and, therefore, his period-two reputation is either very good or very
bad),hewillexertalowereffortlevelinperiodtwo. Inparticular,theexpected
period-twoeffortlevelislowerthanα2 (m1),andtheexpectedmarginalcostof
exerting effort in period two is lower than c  (α2 (m1)). Therefore, the effort-




<c   (α2 (m1)), and the incumbent
chooses a∗
1 <α 2 (m1).
In Martinez (2009b), I analyze the multiple-election version of the model
presented in this section. That is, I analyze a model with more than three
periodsinwhichtheincumbentcouldrunforre-electionmorethanonce. Such
a model allows for the study of situations that do not arise in the one-election
version: With multiple elections, the beginning-of-term reputation may be
better than the average reputation, and the end-of-term effort may not be
maximizedatthebeginning-of-termreputation. Recallthatintheone-election
version of the model, at the beginning of the term, there is a new incumbent
with an average reputation, and the proof of proposition 5 (which shows that a
political cycle arises in the one-election version of the model) is based on the
end-of-term equilibrium effort strategy being such that it is optimal to exert
the maximum effort level for the beginning-of-term reputation. In Martinez
(2009b), I show that the insight described in the one-election version of the
model helps us understand political cycles with multiple elections: For the
same reputation, end-of-term effort is higher if, at the beginning of the term,
the incumbent anticipates that changes in his reputation will, on average, lead
him to choose an end-of-term effort level lower than the one he would choose
for his beginning-of-term reputation. I also show that the model can generate
expected end-of-term effort levels higher than the beginning-of-term effort
level.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Using a career-concern model of political cycles, this article discusses why
political incentives could be different in election times. First, I show that cy-
cles could arise if end-of-term political actions are more effective in changing
the re-election probability than beginning-of-term actions. Following earlier
8As I explain in Martinez (2009b), one can expect equilibrium effort to be hump-shaped in
the incumbent’s belief if better incumbents are less (more) likely to produce bad (good) signals.
One can expect equilibrium effort to be hump-shaped in the voters’ belief if extreme signals are
less likely than average signals.332 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
theoretical studies of political cycles, I model this intuition in its most ex-
treme form. In particular, I assumed that at the time of the election, only the
end-of-term ability is not observable; that only the incumbent’s end-of-term
performance is correlated with his post-election performance; and that the
incumbent’s performance is a perfect signal of his type. Then, I relax each of
these assumptions and discuss how they affect results. In particular, I show
that the model still generates cycles without assuming strong asymmetries
acrossperiodsbecauseoftheeffort-smoothingconsiderationsIﬁrstdescribed
in Martinez (2009b). The analysis in this article helps one understand other
agencyrelationshipsinwhichanimportantpartofthecompensationisdecided
upon infrequently.
APPENDIX A : PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In equilibrium, a∗
1 = a1 and, therefore, the ﬁrst-order condition of the incum-
bent’s period-one problem reads







































(12), there is a unique period-one equilibrium effort level, a∗
1, that can easily
be obtained from equation (13) (the right-hand side of equation 13 does not
depend on the period-one effort level).





is symmetric with respect to η1 with the maxi-






is a symmetric function with





symmetric function with respect to η1 with the maximum at η1 = m1.I n
addition, a∗ 
2 (m1) = 0, and, for any A ∈  , a∗ 
2 (m1 + A) =− a∗ 
2 (m1 − A)L. Martinez: Political Incentives and Elections 333


















and according to equation (13), a∗
1 = 0.
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